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Abstract
Street art is a blossoming field of aesthetics, but aestheticians have yet to elucidate a theory of
the relationship between street art and film. Film and street art seem intuitively antithetical.
Street art is a static art form that interacts with the physical space it inhabits, while film moves
and requires projection onto a surface. These intuitions, however prevalent in society, neglect the
burgeoning styles of avant-garde film and street art that subvert tropes of both artforms. I assert
that film-as-street-art, or cinematic street art, is feasible practice, both philosophically and
practically. I discuss the extant ontologies of street art and endorse Bacharach’s theory of
aconsensuality, which emphasizes the importance of avoiding seeking permission when creating
street art. Subsequently, I discuss two ontologies of film: Walton’s transparency thesis and
Carroll’s ontology of film, and argue in favor of Carroll. Utilizing the frameworks of Bacharach
and Carroll, my research dissects two examples of potential examples of cinematic street art, the
practice of video painting and the short film MUTO, which I argue cannot be defined as
cinematic street art. Second, I suggest types of cinematic street art and provide a theory for
cinematic street art as a practice. The distinct practice of cinematic street art requires that an
artwork be placed aconsensually, make the street essential to the function of the artwork, and
retain the qualities of a film that Carroll lays out.
Keywords: street art, philosophy of film, aesthetics, ontology of film, cinematic street art
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Public Access Screenings: An Ontological Inquiry into Cinematic Street Art1
I.

Press Play
On July 25, 2019, Twitter was ablaze as independent entertainment company and hipster

darling A24 cryptically tweeted a video with six of their films each listed with a respective set of
coordinates. Entitled “Public Access,” A24 led a campaign that brought a select few of their
acclaimed films to the places they were set in via massive white billboards, all free of charge
(Sicurella, 2019). The creative publicity stunt not only capitalized on the unique sense of space
that many of their films are imbued with, the films were situated in such a way that it is
reminiscent of an adjacent artform: street art.2 Yet, philosophers of street art, the few that there
are presently, have neglected discussing the feasibility of an intersection between street art and
film. The disparate methods of production for these artforms may intuitively feel incongruous,
given that we often associate street art with graffiti, stencils, and sculptures and film with sitespecific projection. I argue that, despite their appearances, street art and film are not
ontologically antithetical artforms. That is, while I concede that film-as-street art (henceforth
cinematic street art) is a niche approach not yet utilized by street artists, its ontological and
pragmatic process is reconcilable with the current ontologies of street art. Furthermore, if
philosophers wish to accommodate more broadly film within the canon of street art, then I
challenge them to provide a more rigorous definition that encompasses the totality of visual
artforms.
This paper is organized into four sections; in the first two sections, I will review the
philosophical literature on street art and film and contest some theories of the respective

1

I wish to thank Sara Protasi, Sondra Bacharach, Andrea Baldini, Nicholas Riggle, Aaron Meskin, John Trafton,
and Colleen Hanson for their guidance, support, and collaboration in the completion of this project.
2
This is especially true of the Good Time Public Access screening, which occurred on a billboard next to a
Brooklyn subway stop.
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mediums; in the third section, I will address a specific artwork that some aestheticians would
regard as cinematic street art; the fourth section will supply a constructive argument for
cinematic street art and account for potential counterarguments.

II.

Sketching the Street Art Debate
In “Street art: The transfiguration of common places,” Riggle (2010) contends that “[a]n

artwork is street art if, and only if, its material use of the street is internal to its meaning” (italics
original; p. 246). The definition joins two claims: street art must make material use of the street
and this material use is internal, or essential, to how the artwork functions in space. To clarify,
what Riggle means is that an artist utilizes the material street by binding the very existence of the
artwork to the street. The most obvious examples of this are graffiti artworks, which literally
adhere to the street that the artist paints them on; the same may be said of wheatpaste, ceramics,
and wallpapering. A painting produced in, say, a studio on a canvas and subsequently hung in an
alley would not satisfy either of Riggle’s requirements, since it would not make use of the street
nor make meaning from the street. If this painting were removed from the street and hung instead
in an art gallery, it would retain its meaning and effect; the same can be said of commercial art
and advertisements (p. 246). A prominent and paradigmatic example of street painting, according
to Riggle, is Invader, the Paris-based street artist who has now ‘invaded’ 65 cities and 33
countries (https://urban-nation.com/artist/invader/). Invader’s moniker is a reference to the
classic 1978 video game Space Invaders, which he emulates with his mosaics of the pixelated
sprites.3 The remarkable art he produces is not always located on the physical street, yet it is

3

Invader’s website is located here: https://www.space-invaders.com/home/
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generally uncontested as street art.4 Another example Riggle provides is the artist C.Finley, who
adornes unappealing dumpsters with wallpaper to beautify them. When someone eventually rips
the wallpaper off or it naturally peels away from the metal box, the meaning of the art
disintegrates with it (ibid.). Thus, Finley’s work makes the street internal to the function of her
unique artworks.
Of course, street art encapsulates more than conventional media. Seed-bombing, the
practice of planting packets of flower seeds into neglected spaces, is widely considered by
aestheticians to be street art (e.g. Bacharach, 2016; Willard, 2016). Its titular cousin, yarnbombing, similarly beautifies unappealing spaces with knit fabrics (e.g. bike rack cozies). One
such artwork, Tank Cozy by Marianne Jorgensen, is not only a humorous juxtaposition of
feminine hot-pink fabric knit onto a tank, it is an anti-war commentary and critique of military
fetishization. In each of these approaches, the artwork makes use of the material street rather
than simply being placed on it. Indubitably the street itself becomes a potent source of meaning
for the artwork, hence satisfying Riggle’s internality requirement. This also entails that when an
artwork created for the street is removed from it, then a portion of its effect is lost, for artwork in
the street “outstrips the power of its manifest aesthetic properties” (Riggle, 2010, p. 250).
The term ‘street’ itself, however, has been obscured by the presence of street art not
spatially located in the street. Banksy, the most well-known working street artist, epitomized this
conundrum with his 2004 piece Banksus Militus Ratus, a stuffed rat with the inscription “Our
time will come…” placed inside the London Natural History museum without permission.
Banksus Militus Ratus is undoubtedly street art in the eyes of aestheticians for its activist

4

A quick search on Google of the “top 10 most famous street-artists” consistently yields Invader, among others.
This in itself is not indicative of their philosophical status as street artists, but it demonstrates that there is a
consensus among the general public on what street art looks like.
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functions and subversive properties (Bacharach, 2016), but it poses a problem for those who rely
on street art existing in the street. Riggle (2010) himself is aporetic when defining the notion of
street. He explains that, in order for a space to count as the street, “people must treat it as the
street” (p. 255). This is an intuitive enough suggestion, but he muddies the waters by adding that
this means “maintain[ing] a vague constellation of practical attitudes toward [the street]” (ibid.).
Public approbation also plays a key role in defining the relationship between public and
street art. When the public enjoys the effect of a given piece of street art, they are much less
likely to remove it from the space it is presented in. Conversely, if the public dislikes what has
been created, people may be motivated to seek its removal through the local agencies or take it
upon themselves. On the street, an artwork’s impact or resonance with the surrounding
community is measured by the length of time it stays up. The most widely appreciated artworks
may stay up permanently, but there is always a tacit understanding that art may be removed at
any time by anyone. This is a marked contrast from public art, which, ironically, cares not for the
public’s initial or continued approval. Since public art is usually commissioned by bureaucratic
authorities and protected by law, its effect cannot be predicated on its ability to remain unscathed
-- it is expected to be.
Baldini (2016) argues that Riggle neglects “subversiveness” of street art in his appraisal
of the medium. For Baldini, the disruption of the banal environments street art is often placed in
is tantamount to our conception of street art. Disrupting the concrete jungle of New York with a
vibrant mosaic (ex. Invader) also disrupts our thinking and expectations, engendering situational
awareness and new modes of thought. Aestheticians broadly concur on this notion, even Riggle,
but Baldini is particularly keen on positing that this disruptive value inherits its power from
subversiveness. Some of Baldini’s other criticisms seem to stem from theoretical
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misunderstandings that Riggle (2016) clarifies, but other scholars challenge Riggle’s definition
too, as will be discussed next.
Riggle’s article, which garnered him both praise and criticism, has promulgated discourse
about street art’s ontology. Bacharach (2016) posits that aconsensuality is the determinant of
street art, Chackal (2016) observes that illegality and illicitness are just as, or even more so,
integral to the function of street art as is the street, and Baldini (forthcoming) establishes a
performance-centered ontology for street art. Let us first discuss aconsensuality. Aconsensuality,
unlike consensuality or non-consensuality, refrains from seeking consent from a party
(Bacharach, 2016, p. 486). A party, x, commits aconsensual act z when they do not ask the other
party (or parties), y, for their permission to engage in said act. By contrast, if party x was denied
permission from party y to engage in z act, but proceeded to engage in z act, this would be nonconsensual. According to Bacharach, aconsensuality is the framework that we employ for
measuring the status of a street art artwork, as well as how we delineate public art from street art.
Artworks that go through the bureaucratic authorities in government and receive funding from
those sources have been publicly sanctioned, whereas street art circumvents this entire process
and often exploits it. Bacharach explicates her ontology further through a four-step method of
street art production that integrates aconsensuality:
(1) these works are subject to alterations and destruction, and hence street artists accept
the resulting ephemerality of their works; (2) these works are often illegal; (3) street
artists have a strong incentive to remain anonymous… (4) if street artists strive to make
defiant and subversive art, art that falls outside of the mainstream, then it should come as
no surprise that their work is often deeply antithetical to the art world. (p. 487)
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To illustrate this method, Bacharach turns to the case of Barry McGee, a street artist
commissioned by the city of Sydney for public art. Accused of being a sell-out, McGee created
both the commissioned artwork as well as an aconsensual one, reestablishing his bona fides as a
street artist in the community (p. 488). Bacharach does not believe aconsensual art is mutually
exclusive with illegality (p. 481); in other words, one could theoretically make street art that is
aconsensual but not illegal. The rather ambiguous supposition, Baldini (2018) points out, is
antinominous since aconsensuality conceptually implies de jure regulatory violations of a given
space (p. 14). Private property is designated in legal documents, so to produce an aconsensual
artwork, which Bacharach says occurs on private property, entails that the artist violates the
city’s regulations for private property (Bacharach, 2016, p. 486). But there is a response to this
criticism. In 2009, the Brazilian government passed legislation that legalized street art in cases
where consent by the property owners was given to the artist (Young, 2012). We can imagine a
similar case wherein a city or state level government passed a law sanctioning all street art, but
forewent the consent proviso. Street artists would now be empowered to produce artworks in any
space, including private properties, without legal repercussions; this does not have any bearing
on aconsensuality. In effect, an artist could still produce the artwork aconsensually but not
violate the legal statutes of the city. Bacharach’s ontology is sensible, but other scholars have
sought to define street art in its legality.
Chackal (2016) assesses street art as contingent upon two variables, illegality and
illicitness. Chackal’s account marks these two variables as “co-constitutive” since illegal street
artworks are de facto contradictory to social conventions (p. 363). Alison Young (2014), who
Chackal quotes on the subject, finds that, despite illegality being a prominent feature of street
art,“[i]nvoking the illegality… as the central definitional feature is also problematic” (Young,
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2014, p. 4). Taken to its logical extreme, as we will soon encounter in Baldini’s criticism,
illegality relies on judicial authority to determine the artistic merit of an artwork. Chackal
responds that illegality has been a central feature of the production of street art, especially in its
inception in 1970s urban graffiti, thus contemporary productions still rely on illegality as a
source of cultural capital and authenticity. Furthermore, illegality accounts for the intentionality
of street authors in their approach, the ephemerality of their works, and the necessity for
anonymity. Baldini (2018) again provides a strong counterargument to illegality as a necessary
and sufficient condition for street art. He provides the following dialectic: a street artist
completes a painting, is arrested by a police officer directly after completing it, and is acquitted
by a judge. The precedent set by this hypothetical case, or an actual case similar to it, would
entail that the judicial system assumes street art to be illegal a priori. The onus is thus placed on
the artist to justify why their creativity is worthy of exoneration, therefore we reach a reductio ad
absurdum wherein all street art is essentially illegal (Baldini, 2018, p. 24). For Baldini, illegality
is one of the multiple variables that we consider when analyzing street art. This is not to mitigate
the importance we place on illegality when evaluating street artworks -- illegality is often a
highly salient trait we consider in this medium. However, Baldini contends we face a reductio ad
absurdum that is unconducive to understanding street when we fixate on illegality, as Chackal
does. What Chackal does provide is a suggestion for a performance aspect of street art that
Bacharach’s object-centered ontology fails to capture.
Baldini’s work advances Chackal’s notion of street art as performance into a
performance-centered ontology (Baldini, 2017; Baldini, 2018; Baldini, forthcoming). The
performance-centered ontology that Baldini endorses holds that we appreciate not so much the
product of the street artist’s action but instead their “generative actions, ” an application of
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Davies (2004) theory of art as performance (Baldini, forthcoming, p. 290). We may notice a tag
placed at the highest point on a bridge or behind heavily secured barriers and wonder, “How did
someone manage to get up there?” Perhaps we witness an intricate tag conspicuously placed in a
populated location and ponder, “How did this artist manage to avoid arrest?” Tacit in each of
these queries is an appreciation of the performance involved in the production of an artwork. The
appreciative practice of street art is not amenable to an object-centered ontology like that of
Bacharach (2016); it is incapable of judging the constitutive components of the street art
performance. Crucially, street art is an improvisational artform grounded in spontaneity. No
matter how thoroughly one plans their street artwork, there are unpredictable variables that will
alter the production. Spontaneity is a prominent feature of street art, one that we should consider
because it disrupts “enduring patterns” of behavior and objects by injecting discontinuities in the
environment (Hausman, 1975, qtd. in Baldini, forthcoming, p. 287). Rebellion against authority
manifests itself in spontaneity, Baldini asserts, contributing to street art’s essential
subversiveness. To clarify, subversiveness, as adapted by Baldini (2018) from Ásta (2008, 2013),
is a social property. Humans confer social properties onto objects based upon their judgments of
physical facts, according to Ásta. Baldini points out that, in the particular case of street art, our
judgments are not constituted merely from identifying the content and legality of the artwork
(Baldini, 2018, p. 31). We confer subversiveness from the aggregation of these facts. Ásta (2013)
also observes that social properties are properties dependent on the response of individuals. In
that way, subversiveness is also a contextually-dependent construct, oscillating between the
different cultural, historical, and sociological contexts of a place. When evaluating the
subversiveness of an object, one must examine it holistically based on the aforementioned
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variables. Object-centered ontologies give primacy to the work-product such that concerns of
spontaneity and subversiveness are relegated or altogether disregarded.
Baldini’s performance-based ontology is compelling at first glance. Previous attempts at
constructing an ontology of street art have yielded mixed results, partially because these
ontologies have neglected integrating the generative performance of street art. Baldini articulates
precisely this concern and purports to redress it, but the performance-based ontology is just as
problematic as previous endeavors. Performance-based ontology regards the street art workproduct as ancillary to the performance and favors a narrow breed of the diverse medium. In
virtue of endorsing an ontology that assumes that appreciation is derived from the performance,
the work-product simply becomes the manifestation of this performance. Baldini (forthcoming)
himself labels street artworks as “traces revealing a street artist’s activity,” traces of an activity
that “an appreciator can imaginatively reconstruct” when viewing an artwork (p. 291).
Theorizing street art artworks as traces accommodates those street artworks that are unconcerned
with the aesthetic value of their product, viz. graffiti. Conveniently, Baldini often supplements
his ontology with myriad examples of graffiti, rather than a broad selection from the medium.
When we introduce Blu’s monolithic murals or Shelly Miller’s breathtaking sugar paintings into
the discussion, there is unmistakably an aesthetic appreciation working in tandem with
performance appreciation. Our holistic examination of street art reveals that Baldini’s ontology is
predisposed towards a genus of street art, not the species itself. Where that leaves us then is with
aconsensuality, which we have adequately defended from Baldini’s counterargument. Let us not
completely discount Riggle’s ontology either, for Bacharach endorses the general notion that
street art makes the street internal to its meaning, as do I. What Riggle’s ontology lacks is a
sufficient definition for conceptualizing the street, so our endorsements are tentative. We may be
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able to largely circumvent this issue by assenting aconsensuality, but another crucial deficiency
of the extant street art ontologies are that they have all managed to neglect a ubiquitous form of
contemporary art: film.

III.

Developing a Clearer Picture of the Moving Image
The ontological study of film has existed nearly as long as the medium itself, emerging in

Hugo Münsterberg’s (1916) monograph The Photoplay: A Psychological Study. Unique in its
ability to circumvent the boundaries of time, space, and causality, film is a visual medium
“adjusted to the free play of our mental experiences and which reach[es] complete isolation from
the practical world through the perfect unity of plot and pictorial appearance” (p. 138). The inner
world of the film, later to be denoted as the diegesis, was of particular interest to Münsterberg as
a psychologist. Unlike other visual mediums, we are (ideally) completely immersed in the
sensory experience of watching whatever film is playing. Filmmakers achieve this continuity of
existence through formal techniques such as editing, shot composition, costuming, and lighting.
Moreover, the ‘photoplay’ was still in its infancy when Münsterberg was writing in 1916; a
century later, proliferation of movies has exponentially grown. Film critic André Bazin, inspired
by Münsterberg’s work, indelibly transformed the landscape of film ontology with What is
Cinema? (1971), a two-volume interrogation into every facet of the moving image with
appraisals of exemplary films. The photograph, millions of which compose a film, is the mirror
that a director holds up to reality in creating their art. Bazin believes that the photograph is
therefore uniquely transparent:
Only a photographic lens can give us the kind of image of the object that is capable of
satisfying the deep need man has to substitute for it something more than a mere
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approximation, a kind of decal or transfer. The photographic image is the object itself, the
object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern it. (p. 26)
Film’s ability to bridge the gap between realism and the real is the apotheosis of the Renaissance
tradition of painting. Where centuries of artists had attempted to recreate a moment in time,
photography now enabled them to create images for people to look through, rather than at (p.
165). This entails a fundamental disjunction between painting and moving images: one’s
perception and enjoyment of paintings relies on aesthetic interest, whereas photographs are
aesthetically disinterested. The photograph is identical with the object itself for Bazin, so, in
seeing the photograph, we care not for its inherent aesthetic properties; we are aesthetically
disinterested in the photograph.5 A second, more conspicuous disjunction between painting and
film concerns counterfactual dependence.
Counterfactual dependence refers to the dependent relationship between an object and
observer in art. If object x is photographed by person y, then it axiomatically follows that object
x will appear in the photograph as it existed when seen by person y (Currie, 1996, p. 53). If I take
a photograph of cars I see passing by on the freeway, then the photograph will represent the cars
passing by on the freeway as they are. I do not expect that the image will show them levitating or
driving in reverse because the camera is dependent on the counterfactual (or actual) object.
Painters, on the contrary, act as the intermediary between the object and the image
(Walton, 1984, p. 261). If I were to paint the same image that I previously photographed, I now
have the liberty to modify how the cars appear as much or as little as I like. Perhaps I wish to
paint each car blue in my scene, even as the assortment of car colors in the freeway is more
variegated. My intervention in this instance, a freedom that any artist may exercise in their

5

We will return to this concept shortly when evaluating the transparency thesis of Kendall Walton.
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artwork, is an indication that we are independent of the counterfactual situation we are
representing when painting. Therefore, according to Kendall Walton’s (1984) transparency
thesis, when I see a photograph of cars passing by on the freeway, or of my great-greatgrandmother who is long deceased, I am seeing those objects themselves (p. 251).
An objection to the Transparency transparent thesis is that neither photographs nor the
moving image contains the necessary spatial egocentric information to be transparent.6 Spatial
egocentric information, sometimes called spatiotemporal information, refers to the human ability
to gain knowledge about the location of objects in space and time through our perception (Currie,
1995). There exist many prosthetic devices that we regard as transparent, such as mirrors,
periscopes, and telescopes. Walton exploits this slippery slope as a challenge to his skeptics:
differentiate those prosthetic seeing devices from photography or cinematography. Although this
challenge might seem to sweep the rug out from under us, this is not so when we realize that it
would be fallacious to assume there is continuity between these prosthetic devices and
photographs. All optical devices, including mirrors, enable the user to ascertain spatial
egocentric information in the process. For, if humans were unable to see where objects,
especially threats, lie, then our survivability would be significantly diminished. In the case of
prosthetic seeing devices, we can still look around the imminent space in the lens or the mirror
and know what is there. Photographs cannot give us the same spatial egocentric information any
bodily or prosthetic seeing device can (Currie, 1995, 65). Without such information, photographs
cannot be transparent and are therefore not things we merely see through.
Walton (1997) provides a thought experiment to counter the spatial egocentric argument.
Suppose that I am seeing a carnation through a series of mirrors, ignorant of their number, their

6

There are other refutations to the Transparency thesis that we will not discuss for our limited purposes, including
Carroll’s (2008) argument against aesthetic disinterest.
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location, or the fact that there are mirrors. Even though I lack egocentric information of the
carnation, Walton asserts that I see that carnation. He then introduces a variation, wherein I see
the carnation in front of me, but now I suspect there are mirrors on each wall which preclude me
from knowing where the carnation truly is (Walton, 1997, p. 129). In this case -- Walton argues - if asked if I see the carnation, I would say that I do not. Thus, Walton himself invokes the
weakness of a doxastic requirement (belief requirement) on the part of the seer. Stated another
way, agreeing that we cannot see the carnation in the second case means we tacitly agree that our
beliefs affect how we see the carnation. Cohen and Meskin (2004) suggest that, although my
beliefs may be undermined or eroded because of the mirrors, it does not follow that “such
confusion should vitiate [my] capacity to see” (p. 199). Undoubtedly I may question where the
carnation is, but my belief does not prevent me from accessing reliable spatial egocentric
information about the carnation insofar as I can orient myself toward the object. We cannot
spatially orient ourselves within a photograph, at least to the degree that would be sufficient to
warrant a serious interrogation of the notion (Caroll, 2008, p. 102).7 Therefore, the transparency
thesis collapses under the pressure of its own suppositions.
Of course, we still require an adequate explanation for what film is, one that we may
adduce in evaluating its compatibility with street art. There are myriad comprehensive accounts
that philosophers have provided in answering the question, “what is cinema?”8 No doubt that one
could ask ten philosophers for their definition of film and come away with eleven answers, but

7

The advent of 3D imaging for popular entertainment (movies, televisions, and recently in the Facebook
application), as well as the proliferation of omnidirectional (360-degree) cameras are noteworthy technological
advancements which bear consideration. These technologies mimic the effect of inhabiting a 3D environment, but
insofar as they simulate this effect rather than providing spatial egocentric information, then they are merely optical
illusions. If 3D imaging were to advance in such a way as to provide the same physiological stimulation as existing
in a real environment, this may refute the argument for spatial egocentricity discussed above.
8
See Bazin (1971), Danto (1979), and Currie (1995) for other prominent ontologies of cinema.
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for our purposes, Noël Carroll (2008) has elucidated the most comprehensive definition for the
phenomenon. Carroll describes x cinematic work such:
x is a moving image if and only if (1) x is a detached display or a series thereof; (2) x
belongs to the class of things from which the promotion of the impression of movement
is technically possible; (3) performance tokens of x are generated by templates that are
themselves tokens; (4) performance tokens of x are not artworks in their own rights; and
(5) x is two-dimensional. (p. 73)
Let us elaborate on this definition piecemeal. The notion of detached display is an intuitive
extension of spatial egocentricity. When we perceive an object in space normally, we ascertain
spatial egocentric information about said object in relation to us that we use to orient ourselves
toward it. If I am standing on Crissy Field in San Francisco looking toward the Golden Gate
Bridge, I orient myself to face directly toward the iconic structure. However, if I am in New
Orleans watching the shot of the Golden Gate Bridge in Dirty Harry, I cannot immediately orient
myself toward the Golden Gate Bridge. Film is evidently “phenomenologically detached” from
our physical bodies, even if the camera interacts with the space around it (p. 57). This brings us
to Carroll’s second requirement: the moving image belongs to a category that gives the
impression of movement. When we watch a movie, we anticipate movement to occur in the film;
this expectation is rational for a viewer to have given the nature of the moving image itself.
However, it is perfectly reasonable that a filmmaker may exploit this human inclination for their
own ends. Carroll gestures to Chris Marker’s La Jetée, a film composed of still images that
convey a story. The very essence of such a work is an artistic antinomy; yet, are we to deny that
Marker’s much-lauded film is no longer that which it is routinely categorized as? Because we
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must account for static films, Carroll’s second requirement presupposes that we anticipate
movement when watching a film, rather than categorically assume it (p. 61).
Having assuaged the first two concerns, a new problem is introduced in the theater.
Motion pictures and theatrical performances are kindred spirits, so much so that the nascent film
industry struggled to differentiate itself from theatrical performance. Though it evolved into a
distinct artform by the mid-1910s, theatre and film both belong to the “multiple-instance” type of
art (p. 64). Each instance, or performance, of the art is designated as a token experience;
however, these token performances are produced entirely differently. Motion picture
‘performance’ is a referent for the use of a template -- DVD, Blu-Ray, film reel, VHS, streamed
video -- to show a movie, whereas a token performance for the theater is an interpretation of a
play, a “recipe” as Carroll insightfully describes it (p. 66).9 When a theatregoer witnessed
Laurence Olivier performing in a rendition of Hamlet at the Globe Theatre, they witnessed the
performance token of Shakespeare’s text as interpreted by Olivier; in this instance, the
interpretation is the artwork. When a moviegoer witnessed a performance token of Olivier as
Hamlet in his film adaptation of the play, the performance token was generated from a film reel
template; in this instance, the film reel was the artwork. Thus, requirements three and four
acknowledge that film “performance tokens” (a screening of a film) are generated from a
template (ex. DVD) and, unlike theatrical performance tokens, these tokens are not artworks unto
themselves. Yet, one class of counterexample, the mechanical figurine, appears to fit all of the
requirements (p. 72). The mechanized Jack Sparrow that peeks out of a barrel on the Pirates of

9

Arthur Danto (1985) discusses the significant role that actors play in delineating a film from a theatre performance.
He writes: “In a movie, a role belongs to the person who plays it in the sense that were another to play the so-called
same role, it would be in a different work. So the fact that films use actors ought not to mislead us into thinking of
film as an essentially performative art inasmuch as nothing counts as a different performance of the same work.”
(italics original; p. 107).
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the Carribean ride in Disneyland still fits the bill, yet no one acquainted even in the most
tangential way with film would defend mechanical figurines as film. To avoid this objection, the
final requirement enumerated by Carroll stipulates that a motion picture must be twodimensional.
Having briefly laid the ontological foundations for both street art and film most germane
to our discussion, we may now build our argument concerning the relationship between these
two prominent forms of contemporary art.

IV.

The MUTO Dilemma
Ask most aestheticians interested in street art what their mind goes to when they

contemplate cinematic street art and likely all will mention MUTO. MUTO (2008)10 is a shortfilm by the street artist Blu, a renowned street artist famous for his intricately painted murals and
animated shorts.11 These shorts all utilize the street in the same way -- that is, the street becomes
an individual frame of animation for the video.12 Blu individually paints an image, photographs
it, paints over it, and paints the same image a few inches ahead of the previous. The tedious
process yields a truly astonishing reward for us viewers, but MUTO also poses a dilemma
because it is amenable to certain ontological accounts of street art but not others. I argue that
MUTO cannot be cinematic street art.
For their parts, Riggle (2010) and Baldini (forthcoming) identify MUTO as street art, and
Riggle specifically gestures to consensus among artists and appreciators that Blu’s film is street
art as proof of its status (Riggle, 2010, p. 256). The status of MUTO is much more precarious

10

MUTO is available here: https://youtu.be/uuGaqLT-gO4
Blu’s body of work is available here: http://blublu.org/b/category/news/
12
Street artists, such as the Broken Fingaz collective in Israel, have since reused Blu’s technique for their own
artworks: https://vimeo.com/10555187
11
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viewed through the lens of Bacharach’s ontology. Should we accept Bacharach’s view that street
art broadly is aconsensual, we would have to accept that each individual artwork must be
aconsensual. Given this, MUTO would need to itself be an aconsensually-produced film. “What
is the issue with this?” the performance-centered ontologian may ask. I may necessarily concede
that Blu produced his individual artworks, the frames of each painting, without consent from the
property owners, therefore each artwork is street art in itself. This is irrelevant, however, since
the aconsensuality of these artworks does not apply to the film -- aconsensuality is not a
transferable property as elucidated by Bacharach. The aconsensuality of an artwork is
inextricably linked to it and cannot apply to any other artwork by proxy, such as a photograph
taken of an aconsensual artwork. A natural solution to this may be to invoke Walton’s
transparency thesis. If photographs are transparent, then there is no aconsensuality to be
transferred between Blu’s street artworks and MUTO: the photograph, by virtue of being seen
through, is aconsensual. This is a tempting solution, but it necessitates that we back a theory
proven dubious. Even if we discount the spatial egocentricity counterargument, a new
predicament rears its head. Encountering street art ‘in the wild’ is an intuitively distinct
experience from encountering street art on Instagram. What Riggle (2010) brilliantly describes as
an “unsolicited aesthetic injection,” that moment of happening upon street art on an otherwise
ordinary walk, is incomparable to the phenomenological event of finding a picture of street art on
the internet. Having acknowledged the phenomenological disparity between these two
experiences, we disarm the transparency theorist’s potential argument that seeing street art in the
wild and in a photograph is the same experience.
Perhaps the most controversial characteristic of MUTO is the one we have not yet
addressed, that the short-film is not located in physical space. Each example supplied herein or in
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the extant street art literature assumes a priori that street art begins and ends on the street. For, if
the conception of a street artwork was not the street, then its genealogical essence would be of
another kind. Components of a street artwork (e.g. stencils for spray painting, knitted fabrics for
yarn bombing) may be created beforehand, but the product is only realized in the street. The
converse is true of MUTO. The street artwork paintings in Blu’s short-film are components
analogous to stencils, ad hoc tools for the creation of an artwork. MUTO brilliantly utilizes one
medium, street art, to generate a product in another, film. But, dissimilar to street art, MUTO
does not become a film until after it has been on the street. Not until all of the still frames are
organized chronologically in editing software is the film realized. If street art is conceived in the
street, then cinematic street art is as well. Since MUTO does not become a film until after the
street, the cinematographic element of it cannot be a component of a street artwork. This is why
we so naturally conflate MUTO as cinematic street art when it is a film about street art!13
If MUTO cannot be cinematic street art because it is not aconsensually produced,
transparent, or begins in the street, it begets the question, what examples are there, if any?

V.

Finding a Spot for Film in the Street
Possibly the most intuitive and parsimonious solution one may gesture towards as

cinematic street art are films projected onto the street. Far from the unwieldy devices they were a
century ago, projectors are now a highly compact and generally affordable means to watch video
on any space. Why could we not project, say, Akira Kurosawa’s Ikiru onto an alleyway in
Queens and label that cinematic street art? Similar to a knitted yarn-piece that is then attached to

13

My choice of wording here may provoke some criticism. MUTO is not necessarily about street art in the same
way that Varda’s Mur Murs (1981) or Silver’s Style Wars (1983) is. In those documentary films, street art is the
subject that the filmmakers choose in order to engage broader discourses about society. By contrast, street art is the
object in MUTO.
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a street pole, the skeptic could say that Ikiru is an ingredient of the artwork but not yet the
artwork until it is placed in the street. The problem here is that it assumes that Ikiru gains
meaning by virtue of being projected outside of the cinema. In fact, no unique artistic work
occurs because projecting Ikiru itself does not make the street internal to the film’s function. The
film can be projected anywhere in the world and retain its poignancy. Applied retroactively, any
film not produced with the exclusive intention of internalizing a site into the film’s meaning
cannot be street art. This negates the preceding A24 Public Access case as street art. Let’s
disregard for the sake of argument that the Public Access screenings are permitted and therefore
consensual; that conceded, the films themselves do not make the street essential to their meaning.
In an interview with Forbes, an A24 marketing executive stated that the decision was made in
part because A24 films “are rooted in a sense of place” (Dawson, 2019). Showing A24’s films on
billboards in their respective environments democratizes the art, similar to street art, and
engenders immersion. Yet, the environmental complementarity is just that: complementarity.
Their films in and out of the billboard projection spaces are unchanged and utilize the same
template. Cinematic street art requires that we find a film that transfigures the space it inhabits
akin to the methods that other street artworks do, or more broadly that we find a means to
transfigure a space cinematically.
Suppose that rather than projecting an existing film on the street, we projected a film
intentionally created for a specific space. Say, for example, that there is a brick apartment
building in Queens that we choose to make an artwork for. Every night, we notice that the man
living in apartment 4A opens his window to get some fresh air. For a week, we project a video
that we have made onto the window of apartment 4A. In it, a man falls out of the apartment and
towards the ground, and the token is repeated in a thirty-second loop from the template movie we
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created. The street is internal to the cinematic artwork’s meaning in this scenario, both in its
temporality and its dedicated use in the street, it checks every one of Carroll’s boxes, and it can
be produced aconsensually. However, even in this example it is not clear that the street is
transfigurated in the relevant sense. Indeed, LED throwies or sugar art, artworks that do not alter
the surface, still hang from the street or adhere to it. Such artworks supply a fair counterpoint to
concerns over transfiguration, but it does not account for the breadth of street art practices. In
protest of defense contractors developing laser weapons, the legendary collective Graffiti
Research Lab (GRL) designed a laser projection device called L.A.S.E.R. Tag (2007).14 In
layman’s terms, a high-powered projector recreates images that a person draws with a laser by
tracking the movements of the laser with a computer program, creating the illusion of drawing
with a laser. Street art of this variety reworks our concept of the medium with cutting-edge
technology. If one denies that GRL’s L.A.S.E.R. Tag is street art just because of its methods, they
risk nullifying the avant-garde ethos of street art. We have made a foray into cinematic street art
with the suggestion of a projected subcategory of cinematic street art, but surely there are more
instances.
In 2009, the art collective Sweatshoppe premiered a new technology that allowed them to
create the illusion of painting with video.15 With each stroke, a piece of the image emerges from
the surface it is placed on, eventually coalescing into a single image or video. The technology
behind their work is still unknown, but likely involves the use of certain light devices and
reactive liquid placed on the surface. Sweatshoppe’s marvelous work seems to check every
ontological box for street art aestheticians and Carroll’s definition of film. Take, for example,

14
15

Their artwork and website is available here: http://www.graffitiresearchlab.com/blog/projects/laser-tag/#video
My thanks to Sondra Bacharach for bringing this collective to my attention.
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Sweatshoppe’s Repopulate (2013) in the occupied Palestinian territory of Israel.16 Sweatshoppe
member Blake Shaw travels to various historical locations in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Jaffa, and
“paints” videos of refugees, symbolically “return[ing] the image of the refugees to their ancestral
homes.” The spatiality of the Repopulate video paintings gain purchase on the artwork’s
meaning. Only by situating these specific films in these specific locations do the video paintings
become a compelling symbolic protest. They are also placed aconsensually, even if they incur no
material consequences for the spaces they are placed in. So far, we seem to have the ideal
candidate for cinematic street art -- until we reexamine the definition of film. Recall Carroll’s
five requirements for determining how a film must function: (1) as a detached display, (2) to give
the impression of movement, (3) be a performance token generated by a templates, (4)
performance tokens are not themselves artworks, and (5) be two-dimensional (Carroll, 2008, p.
73). Sweatshoppe’s approach fulfills (1), (2), (3), and (5), but is antithetical to (4). The videos of
Palestinian refugees in Repopulate are each performance tokens from a template, the template
being a projection or light transmission that causes the chemical reaction in the projection liquid.
What then negates (4) is the interjection of the painting performance itself. Part of the video
painting’s aesthetic value is that the video is revealed through an unpredictable combination of
strokes. In Repopulate, Shaw pushes his roller at random, eventually coalescing into a painted
block that reveals the face of a refugee. In order for video painting to conform with (4), each
performance token would need to be an exact replication of the previous -- this is infeasible in
Sweatshoppe’s approach. Moreover, a hypothetical performance token of this variety would
betray the core experience of video painting as an unpredictable multimedia spectacle.

16

A video of Sweatshoppe’s work available here: https://vimeo.com/65691265

INQUIRY INTO CINEMATIC STREET ART

24

The remaining candidates for us to consider are two primitive forms of film that preceded
the projected movie image: the zoetrope and the Mutoscope. Both devices rely on a manual
crank that the operator spins in order to imbue still images with a sense of motion. The zoetrope
is a cylindrical device inserted with images or 3D models that is viewed through a slit, while the
Mutoscope is a coin-operated device that plays a reel of images in succession, like a flip book,
viewed through a private window. Both devices lost their novelty with the advent of projected
film, but are still used in special occasions or contexts.17 Of pertinence to our discussion is Bill
Brand’s Masstransiscope, a 1980 public artwork installed in the New York subway tunnels. The
artwork consists of 300 feet of individual frames placed on the tunnel wall opposite the train,
with a barrier in between that has 228 individual slits and fluorescent lighting to illuminate the
frames. As the train moves through the tunnel, the gorgeous metamorphosis of shapes animates
and brings aesthetic value to an otherwise mundane subway ride.18 Had Masstransiscope not
been funded by government programs and permitted, it would be accordant with the standards
we set forth for cinematic street art. But the prerequisites for zoetropes as cinematic street art
need not be so elaborate; a common zoetrope installed on the street also fits the bill. Although a
skeptic may counter that the zoetrope is three-dimensional and therefore contradictory to
Carroll’s requirement (5), the image produced from the zoetrope itself is two-dimensional. A
movie playing in the cinema is witnessed in a three-dimensional space, yet we do not say that the
film itself exists three-dimensionally. Mutoscopes could similarly be installed in the street. The
skeptic might also offer the concern that neither of these artworks are subversive, one of the vital

17

The prolific animation studio Pixar created an intricate 3D zoetrope for the release of their landmark film Toy
Story in 1995. The zoetrope has since toured many museums and been displayed in Disneyland, but it is currently on
display at the Academy Museum: https://www.academymuseum.org/en/toy-story-zoetrope.
18
Brand thoroughly documents the making of Masstransiscope on his website here:
https://www.billbrand.net/public-art

INQUIRY INTO CINEMATIC STREET ART

25

characteristics of street art that Baldini (2016; 2018; forthcoming) observes. Subjectivity plays a
serious role in subversiveness. What is subversive is contextually-dependent, Ásta (2013) tells
us, but something as antiquated and rare as a zoetrope or Mutoscope, especially located in the
street, is generally unconventional. To what extent placing these devices in the street is
subversive is up for debate, but it is intuitive and uncontroversial to assert that a zoetrope on the
street subverts norms.
VI.

New Kid on the Block
Street art, once on the cutting edge of avant-garde art, has now become a mainstream

phenomena. Yet, as we create ontologies for the artform and, in doing so, partition the styles of
street art that exist, new questions emerge. This article has answered one such question: what is
film’s place in street art? I have suggested multiple hypothetical and actual examples of
cinematic street art that heretofore were not conceptualized as such, and disputed other examples
that one may have initially demarcated as cinematic street art. If street art scholars wish to
defend the likes of MUTO and video painting as cinematic street art, they bear the burden of
amending the aforementioned street art ontologies or potentially reconceptualizing the artform
entirely. An explanation for why we have such limited examples to reference at this time is that
cinematic street art may be nascent. Its highly particular approach, combined with the recent
advent of consumer film technologies, set a high bar for artists to clear before they have
cinematic street art. I hope then that this article may engender a prescriptive template for street
artists interested in experimenting with cinematic street art.
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